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COMMENTS
THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE IN LOUISIANA-
AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that
the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recov-
ery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears
that the defendant by exercising reasonable care and pru-
dence might have avoided injurious consequences to the
plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence.'
The last clear chance doctrine 2 has grown to play a prominent
role in the law of negligence since its birth in the mid-nineteenth
century. It has been applied with increasing frequency, and
although originally created to avoid some of the rigidity and
harshness of the contributory negligence rule, 3 it has itself be-
come plagued with technicalities, rigidity and misuse.4 The
doctrine, recognized by practically all states,5 now knows almost
as many variations as there are states that apply it.o This Com-
ment traces the history of the doctrine, examines its develop-
ment in Louisiana, investigates its present state and offers some
criticism of the doctrine itself and its application in certain
cases.
I. INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE
Origin, Purpose, and Meaning of Last Clear Chance
Last clear chance was created to escape the harsh effects of
the strict contributory negligence rule, under which a negligent
1. 38 AM. Jun. Last Clear Chance § 215 (1941).
2. Also known as the 'discovered peril doctrine,' 'apparent peril doctrine,'
'humanitarian doctrine,' 'donkey doctrine,' 'last opportunity doctrine,' and even
the 'jackass doctrine,' with whatever implications it may carry. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 65 n.99 (3d ed. 1964).
3. See FLEMING, TORTS 218-19 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as FLEMING]
PROSSER, TORTS § 65, at 438 (3d ed. 1964), [hereinafter cited as PROSSER] ; Green,
Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. REV. 3, 21-33 (1927);
MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1225, 1236
(1940).
4. See generally PROSSER § 65; Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate
Cause, 6 N.C.L. REV. 3, 21-33 (1927).
5. See PROSSER § 65 and Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause,
6 N.C.L. REV. 3, 25 (1927), where it is indicated that the few courts which do
not recognize the doctrine by name enforce its spirit by employing the concepts
of proximate cause and wilful and wanton conduct to circumvent the contributory
negligence rule.
6. See generally PRossER § 65.
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plaintiff could never recover from a negligent defendant if
plaintiffs' negligence was a cause of his own injury.7 The birth
of the doctrine has been attributed to the 1842 English case of
Davies v. Mann.8 A farmer's donkey fettered on a public road
was struck and killed by defendant's wagon, which was' being
driven at a "smartish pace." The court found that defendant,
by using ordinary care, could have avoided hitting the helpless
donkey and allowed the farmer to recover though he too might
have been negligent in leaving his donkey tied in the road.
The contributory negligence rule precludes weighing the re-
spective fault of the parties and placing the loss on the party
more at fault.0  A negligent plaintiff simply could not recover
from a negligent defendant. This result is open to serious
criticism,10 and no doubt the judiciary has been aware of the
unfortunate results possible under a strict application of that
defense. Still, in most jurisdictions, contributory negligence re-
mains an absolute bar to a negligent plaintiff's recovery" unless
his case can be brought under some exception to the rule. Davies
v. Mann supplied one important exception where relief was prob-
ably needed most.12
7. See note 3 supra; FLEMING 218-19: "When the contributory negligence has
assumed its all-or-nothing corollary, the courts disabled themselves from allocating
the loss in proportion to the degree of fault of each of the negligent parties, but
the problem postulated by the frequent inequalities in the respective shares of
responsibility remained. Theoretically, even a slight departure from the standard
of care exacted by law totally debarred the plaintiff from recovery however gross
in comparison the defendant's own fault may have been. Not surprisingly, in-
creasing irritation with the rigour of the mechanical stalemate rule led to a
search for some other formula which could offset its operation in situations where
it involved too drastic a departure from current notions of justice.
"It was . . . with a view to circumventing the common law refusal to counte-
nance a theory of comparative fault, that the last opportunity rule [i.e., last clear
chance] was invented. Just as contributory negligence was defendant's doctrine,
so this became a plaintiff's doctrine." See also Brown v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 135 F. Supp. 28, 30 (E.D. La. 1955), aff'd, 234 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1956).
Sometimes defendant's conduct is deemed wilful, wanton, or reckless, and
plaintiff recovers on the grounds that defendant has committed an intentional
tort, or at least a tort lying outside the defense of contributory negligence. See
["R0SszR 436.
8. 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842). See generally James, Last
Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938) ; MacIntyre,
The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1225 (1940).
9. See generally Macintyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARv. L.
REV. 1225 (1940).
10. See note 7 supra. See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 22.3 (1956).
11. For a discussion of comparative negligence statutes enacted in a few
states, see Prosser, Comparative Negligence, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 1, 19-45 (1956).
12. In its own time Davies was not considered revolutionary. See generally
James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938) ;
MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HIAv. L. REV. 1225 (1940).
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The last clear chance doctrine, a product of judicial policy, 13
is but a device which enables the judge or jury in effect to weigh
the respective fault of the parties where otherwise no balancing
would be possible and permits an imposition of liability upon
the party more to blame. 14 Davies v. Mann illustrates the essen-
tial factors considered in finding defendant more at fault :15
The farmer's negligence was slight, he merely left his donkey
fettered on the side of a road. Defendant alone had the ability
to avoid hitting the helpless donkey, for the donkey could not
move from the defendant's path. Defendant drove the wagon
into the donkey although there was sufficient room for him to
have safely driven around it. And, his negligent conduct was
later in time than that of the plaintiff. This principle is clear
and simple; but when the catch-phrase last clear chance was
used to label it, the underlying policy soon was clouded by a
One view of Davies is that it is consistent with the contributory negligence rule
as iterated in Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East (0 (K.B. 1809) ; for Butterfield
may mean simply that the one-there plaintiff -having a later opportunity to
avoid a mishap caused in part by another's fault cannot recover damages if he
failed to utilize that later opportunity. Davies merely applied the rule of Butter-
field to facts where defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the accident;
thus he had to bear all the loss. While both cases voiced the concept that the
loss be placed on the last wrongdoer, later cases construed Butterfield as im-
posing an absolute bar against plaintiff's recovery if he was partially at fault re-
gardless of the sequence of the parties' negligent acts. Then Davies became known
as a qualification of or exception to the contributory negligence rule of Butter-
field. See FLEMING 218; 2 HARPER & JAMEs, ToR'S § 22.12 (1956) ; Maclntyre,
supra, at 1225-35; Schofield, Davies v. Man: Theory of Contributory Negligence,
3 HARV. L. REv. 263, 273 (1890). The principle of the two cases became further
entangled in the question of causation: "[The last wrongdoer] rule apparently
rests upon the theory that contributory negligence is wholly a question of proxi-
mate cause, and . . . it follows logically that a person guilty of the last negli-
gence . . . is alone responsible; for his negligence is the sole proximate cause.
It also follows logically that whenever the plaintiff's negligence precedes that of
the defendant, it is not contributory negligence; and the rules of contributory
negligence can apply only where the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent and
simultaneous with that of the defendant." Schofield, supra at 274 n.5. See also
1 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE § 118 (1941) ; SALMOND, Tom''s § 10, 10
(6th ed. 1924). But this reasoning breaks down where there arc joint tort-
feasors. For criticisms see 2 HARPER & JAMES, TOuTS 1244-45 (1956) ; PROSSER
436-37; Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233, 237-38 (1908);
Green, Contributory Negligence and Proxinzate Cauise, 6 N.C.I,. REV. 3, 23-30
(1927) ; James, supra at 707-08; Price, Applicability of Last Clear Chance in
Mississippi, 29 Miss. L.J. 250-51 (1958) ; Schofield, supra at 367-69.
13. Cf. FLEMING 218-21 ; Green, Contributory Negligence and Proxirnate Cause,
6 N.C.L. REv. 3 (1927); James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine,
47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938) ; Maclintyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53
HARV. L. REV. 1225 (1940).
14. See FLEMING 217-19. See generally Maclntyre, The Rationale of Last
Clear Chance, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1225 (1940).
15. See FLEMING 218; MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53
HARv. L. REV. 1225, 1231 (1940).
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mass of judicial verbiage.16 If today's courts would not lose
sight of the supporting policy, perhaps less difficulty would be
encountered in the doctrine's application.
Last clear chance does not apply until it is shown that both
plaintiff and defendant were negligent and their negligence was
a cause of the ensuing injury.
The doctrine's literal terms, last clear chance, express its
historic requisites. For the doctrine to be applied against him,
defendant must have had sufficient means to avoid the accident
after plaintiff's peril became apparent (a chance) ; his oppor-
tunity must have been one a reasonable man would have utilized
(a clear chance) ; and he must have had the final opportunity
to avert the harm (the last chance). This last requisite is the
essence of Davies v. Mann. It presupposes that plaintiff is help-
less in a peril from which he could not extricate himself, while
defendant yet has the time and means to avoid him. This makes
time a crucial factor in the applicability of the doctrine 17 and
acknowledges the "medieval principle"' 8 that the last wrongdoer
is the one more at fault; thus he alone should be liable.19 One
may question the last wrongdoer principle ;20 nonetheless, when
courts are confronted with the necessity of determining the
rights between two parties at fault, they cannot be seriously
criticized for seizing upon a circumstance such as time sequence
when it generally leads to the proper solution.
16. See Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. REv.
3, 21-30 (1927).
17. 1 SITEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE 288 (1941)" "The doctrine con-
templates an 'after negligence,' sometimes termed wilfulness, as contraoted with
that violation of an initial duty which is offset by plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence."
18. James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704-08
(1938).
19. Ibid.; FLEMING 217-20; PROSSER 438; 1 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLI-
GENCE 288-90 (1941).
20. E.g., where a train has negligently blocked an extra-hazardous highway
crossing on a foggy night without automatic warning signals operating, or any
other precaution (such as flagmen or flares), and plaintiff runs into the train
while negligently driving at a speed at which he was unable to stop within the
range of his headlights, it strains logic to conclude that the motorist was more
to blame for the accident than the railroad company simply because the former's
negligence occurred subsequent to the latter's. Cf. Finn v. Spokane, Pac. & S. Ry.,
189 Ore. 126, 214 P.2d 354, 218 P.2d 720 (1950). See also criticisms of the
last wrongdoer concept in Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage
Co., 242 La. 471, 488, 137 So. 2d 298, 304 (1962) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS
1156-58, 1258 (1956) ; I'ROSSER 285; James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional
Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704, 717 (1938).
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Factors Restricting Last Clear Chance to Traffic
and Transportation Cases
Last clear chance has been applied almost exclusively to traf-
fic and transportation cases.2 1  Several Louisiana non-traffic
cases have considered the doctrine; a few have applied it. 2 2
But, while granting that last clear chance might apply in a
proper non-traffic case, such cases are rare indeed. Aside from
the difficulty of meeting the requisites of the doctrine23 other
factors tend to restrict its application to traffic cases.
21. Last clear chance was found inapplicable in: Dickey v. Thornburgh, 82
Cal. App. 2d 723, 187 P.2d 132 (1947) (two motorboats collided at night) ; Ram-
sey v. Fontaine Ferry Enterprises, Inc., 314 Ky. 218, 234 S.W.2d 738 (1950)
(girl injured through constant bumping while in a "bumper car") ; State ex rel.
Hamel v. Echo Park Co., 137 Md. 529, 113 Atl. 85 (1921) (girl sitting on arm
of roller coaster seat was thrown from coaster) ; Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy,
Inc., 212 S.C. 485, 48 S.E.2d 324 (1948) (wife sued druggist for selling bar-
biturates to husband, who committed suicide).
Last clear chance was applied in: Vignone v. Pierce & Norton Co., 130 Conn.
309, 33 A.21 427 (1943) (waves from speedboat swamped rowboat); Atkinson
v. Wiard, 153 Kan. 96, 109 P.2d 160 (1941); (plaintiff dragged by joy ride,
operator not at controls) ; Alles v. White Motors Co., 141 Neb. 78, 2 N.W.2d
597 (1942) (one pressed button to close door, plaintiff's arm in door). But
in this last case plaintiff was not found negligent. Note the similarity of this
case to Frentz v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. La. 1958), discussed
note 22 inra.
22. In the following cases last clear chance was found inapplicable: Employ-
ers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Butler, 318 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1963) (girl performed
fire dance wearing a flammable costume; director failed to notice her costume) ;
Dallas v. Crescent Forwarding & Transp. Co., 13 So. 2d 113 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1943) (plaintiff struck by bale of cotton tumbling out of control) ; Howes v.
Wimberly, 15 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943) (boy hurt on manlift after being
warned of danger) ; cf. Kansas City So. R.R. v. ElIzey, 275 U.S. 236 (1927)
(guest passenger denied recovery for driver's recklessness).
The following cases suggest last clear chance applies, although it was un-
necessary for the decision. Frentz v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. La.
1958) (pedestrian caught on drawbridge as bridge was raised; pedestrian jumped
off; not held negligent) ; Litton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 88 F. Supp. 76 (W.D. La.
1950) (plaintiff injured by fumes; no plant warning device; plaintiff not negli-
gent, nor could defendant prevent injury after emergency arose) ; Carroll v.
Louisiana Iron & Supply Co., 17 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944) (plaintiff
struck by pine handled by defendant workmen, plaintiff not found negligent).
See also lissent in Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328
(1966), noted in 27 LA. L. REV. 146 (1966). A man, rendered helpless from
drink, was ejected from bar near a highway and was struck by a car. Dissent
said bar owner had last clear chance. This writer feels the doctrine does not
apply. The creation of a state of helplessness (even if done by defendant) is
not a requisite of the doctrine. It is essential to the application of the doctrine
that plaintiff be in actual peril at a time when defendant could have avoided
plaintiff. Here plaintiff was not in peril until he ventured onto the highway;
then, only the motorist might have had the ability to avoid inflicting the injury.
The following are cases where last clear chance was expressly applied: Moses
v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 174 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) (plain-
tiff struck by tree pushed on him by bulldozer after his presence was known to
operator) ; Fireman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. S. S. Jacobs Co., 162 So. 2d 816 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964) (defendant welders negligently burned down plaintiff's store,
knowing of the danger). In both these cases defendant's conduct is tantamount
to recklessness or intentional misconduct.
23. The requisites of last clear chance are customarily stated as: (1) plain-
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Accidents resulting from the operation of trains, trolleys,
trucks, and automobiles are quite numerous. While their utility
prevents them from being deemed ultrahazardous, 24 courts re-
gard these vehicles as "dangerous instrumentalities" because of
the great damage they can inflict. 25 Negligence of their opera-
tors is still determined by the standard of conduct of a reason-
able man in like circumstances; but in these cases, any deviation,
however slight, from that standard will generally be deemed
negligence.
It is a fundamental duty, both moral and legal, for one to
avoid injuring another if one may reasonably do S0.26 Further-
more, certain duties demand precaution against the possible neg-
ligent acts of other persons.27 It should be of no avail for de-
tiff must be in a perilous position of which he is unaware or from which he
is unable to extricate himself using due care and (2) defendant saw or should
have seen plaintiff's peril (3) in time to reasonably avoid him, using the means
at his disposal. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 162 So. 2d 153 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1964); Smith v. New Orleans & N.E. R.R., 153 So. 2d 533 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; Emmco Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Ins. Co., 150 So. 2d 338
(La. App. lat Cir. 1963); Guidry v. United States Cas. Co., 134 So. 2d 319
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Ballard v. Piehler, 98 So. 2d 273 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957).
24. See PROSSER § 77.
25. Davis v. Lewis & Lewis, 226 La. 1064, 78 So. 2d 174 (1954) ; Rottman v.
Beverly, 183 La. 947, 165 So. 153 (1935); Mequet v. Algiers Mfg. Co., 147 La.
364, 84 So. 904 (1920) ; Prine v. Continental So. Lines, 71 So. 2d 716 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1954) ; Norwood v. Bahn, 14 La. App. 261, 120 So. 183 (1930).
26. See Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 144, 119 N.W. 946, 947 (1909), where the
court said there are "three main heads of duty with which the law of torts is
concerned, namely, to abstain from wilful injury, to respect the property of
others, and to use due diligence to avoid causing harm to others."
See also POLLOCK, TORTS 3 (15th ed. 1951) : "All members of a civilised com-
monwealth are under a general duty toward their neighbours to do them no hurt
without lawful cause or excuse."
27. This principle was implied in Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 540, 152 Eng.
Rep. 588 (1842) (see text accompanying note 8 supra). Parke, B., stated: "[All.
though the ass may have been wrongfully there, still the defendant was bound to
go along the road at such a pace as would be likely to prevent mischief. Were
this not so, a man might justify the driving over goods left on a public highway,
or even over a man lying asleep there, or the purposely running against a car-
riage going on the wrong side of the road."
Cf. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1833), where Brett, M.R., stated:
"Whenever one person is placed . . . in such a position in regard to another
that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that if
he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those
circumstances, he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the
other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger."
Cf. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471,
137 So.2d 298 (1962).
This may also be true in cases concerning injuries to patrons of stores. The
owner of a public place is required to anticipate the negligence of customers and
take reasonable steps to ascertain that no injury results. See The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1963-1964 Term-Torts, 25 LA. L. REv. 334
(1965). See generally PRossEa § 61.
Similar is the duty imposed upon landowners by the "attractive nuisance"
doctrine to employ care in order to protect trespassing children from harming
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fendant, burdened with such a duty, to plead that plaintiff was
contributorily negligent. It would be illogical to say that de-
fendant has the duty to protect plaintiff against his own neg-
ligent acts and in the same breath deny plaintiff recovery on
the basis of that negligence.
This may best be exemplified by some last clear chance cases
where the court finds defendant had two duties. 28 For example,
when a motorist sees an inattentive pedestrian in time to avoid
him but fails to do so, courts sometimes state that when the
motorist discovered the pedestrian's peril he incurred an addi-
tional duty to use all reasonably available means to avoid him.
If the motorist is found not to have employed such means, the
pedestrian will recover despite his inattentiveness. In such
cases, the court is recognizing that at least the second duty re-
quires that defendant protect plaintiff against his own negli-
gence, so that the negligence of plaintiff is no defense if de-
fendant could have avoided the accident by using due diligence.
The earliest cases invoking last clear chance were nearly all
accidents where a pedestrian was struck by a train or trolley.
These cases point out an interesting circumstance which influ-
enced the growth of the doctrine - the nature of the respective
risks involved. Negligent conduct creates an undue risk of in-
jury to someone. Crucial among the factors employed in meas-
uring the degree of risk involved is the function between the
likelihood of injury and the seriousness of that injury which is
likely to arise. In these early cases it is significant that the
defendant (train or trolley operator) is carrying on inherently
dangerous conduct, thereby creating great risk of grievously
injuring others. This phenomenon may be termed a lack of
mutuality of risks: While not outwardly recognized by the
judiciary, it explains why extreme care in the operation of
themselves. See Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2d 614, 126 N.E.2d 836
(1955); Mayer, Adm'x v. Temple Properties, 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909
(1954) Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products Co., 215 Wis. 47, 254 N.W.
351 (1934).
28. Rottman v. Beverly, 183 La. 947, 165 So. 153 (1935); Prine v. Conti-
nental So. Lines, 71 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954); General Exchange
Ins. Corp. v. Carp, 176 So. 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937); Buckley v. Feather-
stone Garage, 11 La. App. 564, 123 So. 446 (1929).
More properly, no second duty is imposed by the doctrine. Operators owe a
constant duty to avoid injuring another regardless of whether the other is negli-
gent or not. All last clear chance does is permit negligent plaintiffs to recover
from all operator who breaks that general duty, where the rule of contributory
negligence vould otherwise preclude plaintiff's recovery. Cf. Elliot v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 83 Conn., 320, 76 Atl. 298 (1910).
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dangerous instrumentalities (trains, trolleys, trucks, and auto-
mobiles) is demanded. A pedestrian's inattention endangers
only himself; hence he breaches a duty owed primarily to him-
self. Where his negligence culminates in an accident, the risk
of harm to others is slight. The engineer's negligence, however,
endangers everything in the train's path; and this is a breach
of a duty owed to the public. 29
There also probably exists an attitude on the part of the
judiciary that transportation instrumentalities should pay their
way. Operation of these dangerous instrumentalities creates a
public risk while directly benefitting the operators. Perhaps it
is not unreasonable that they should be required to compensate
others for injuries resulting from their operation.3 0 Also, rail-
road companies generally carry ample insurance; likewise, al-
most all motor vehicles are insured; much less frequently does
a pedestrian have complete insurance coverage for his personal
injuries. Insurance enables the costs of accidents to be dis-
tributed among all who utilize the instrumentalities. Thus, if
owing to mutual fault an insured motorist strikes an uninsured
pedestrian, by holding the motorist liable, the courts are requir-
ing all drivers to share in the costs of the injury; whereas, if
plaintiff is denied recovery, he alone must bear the entire cost
of his injury.
Because non-traffic and transportation cases are so few and
because the doctrine was designed for and best fits traffic and
transportation situations, this Comment will focus on the latter.
II. GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF LAST CLEAR
CHANCE IN LOUISIANA
To prevent the doctrine from crippling the contributory neg-
ligence rule, Louisiana courts, in their earlier confrontations
with last clear chance, adopted a restrictive attitude. During
29. It might be argued that the engineer need show no greater care for the
pedestrian than he shows for himself. See PROSSER 442; Bohlen, Contributory
Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233, 254-55 (1908). But this attitude is open
to criticism. Why should a negligent operator 'be given a windfall when the
pedestrian is also negligent, since it is the operator, by negligently operating the
dangerous agency, who has created the great public risk of injuring others and
inflicted the damage to plaintiff?
30. See 2 HARPER & JAmES 1208; PROSSER 588; Green, Contributory Negli-
gence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. REV. 3, 31-32 (1940) ; Green, The Duty
Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 275-76; 277-78 (1929).
See also Goss v. Williams, 196 N.C. 213, 145 S.E. 169, 172 (1928), quoted in
Green, supra at 277.
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the depression years, however, earlier fears were forgotten, re-
strictions were relaxed and the doctrine was afforded wider
application. Today, it enjoys a scope much broader than that
readily inferable from the literal terms, last clear chance, or
from the rule of Davies v. Mann.
The principle of Davies was first recognized in 1894 in Mc-
Guire v. Vicksburg, S. & P.R.R.31 Because of steam emitted
from the engine the engineer did not see deceased on the tracks
until it was too late to avoid striking him. After finding the
engineer negligent, the court allowed recovery notwithstanding
deceased's negligence, resting its holding on various grounds32
and adding:
"[T]he contributory negligence of the party injured will not
defeat recovery, if he shows the defendant might, by the
exercise of ordinary care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the injured party's negligence. '33
The language in McGuire closely resembles that of Davies v.
Mann, but its application to the facts of the case was stunningly
liberal.3 4 As a result, the holding of McGuire became subject to
serious limitations beginning the very next year.3 5
The court in McGuire found that the engineer should have
seen the pedestrian's peril in time to prevent the accident and
imposed liability because he failed to see him. This position has
been consistently followed with one three-year period of doubt
during which some courts required that defendant should ac-
tually discover plaintiff's peril before liability would attach, if
31. 46 La. Ann. 1543, 16 So. 457 (1894), McEnery, J., dissenting.
32. The Court stated that in populous areas railroad companies must show
a greater standard of care for the protection of negligent trespassers than they
must in rural areas. It added that defendant could not inflict wanton injury
even upon trespassers, nor was contributory negligence a license for recklessness
and neglect. It found defendant grossly negligent, utilizing no care whatsoever
for the protection of the helpless trespasser. Then it invoked the doctrine of
last clear chance (though not by name). Finally it used its discretion in re-
ducing the $20,000 jury award in favor of plaintiff to $1,000, admittedly the
lowest amount usually awarded for the wrongful death, which suggests that the
court would reduce the award if plaintiff was also at fault in causing his own
injury.
33. McGuire v. Vicksburg, S. & P.R.R., 46 La. Ann. 1543, 1544, 16 So. 457,
462 (1894).
34. Defendant did not see deceased until it was too late to avoid him, nor
was it shown that defendant could have seen deceased sooner, because of the
cloud of steam. Under the traditional trespasser doctrine, defendant's only duty
to deceased was to refrain from inflicting intentional harm after deceased's pres-
ence was actually discovered.
35. Blackwell v. St. Louis, I-M. & S. Ry., 47 La. Ann. 268, 16 So. 818 (1895).
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plaintiff could at any time have removed himself from danger 3 6
Today the rule that last clear chance applies when the defendant
saw or should have seen the plaintiff's peril is given effect in all
instances, 37 regardless of the nature of plaintiff's negligent con-
duct. Thus, defendant may be held liable for a last clear chance
he never knew he had.
The earliest limitation was that plaintiff could not recover
if defendant's negligence occurred prior to his .3 A trespasser
was walking along a track as defendant's train approached him
from the rear at an excessive rate of speed. The engineer saw
plaintiff some distance ahead, but, believing him to be a com-
pany switchman, paid little attention to him. Plaintiff stepped
onto the track immediately in front of the train, and the engi-
neer was unable to stop in time. The court found that both
parties were negligent, but that the negligence of the engineer
in operating the train at an excessive rate of speed occurred
prior to the negligence of the plaintiff, rendering the defendant
unable to avoid the consequences of plaintiff's subsequent negli-
gence; so plaintiff was denied recovery.3 9
The prior negligence restriction involved the same principle
as the subsequent new breach requirement, which was that de-
fendant could not be held liable under last clear chance if he
committed no new breach of duty subsequent to plaintiff's neg-
ligence.40  Both restrictions accomplished the same end; last
36. Rottman v. Beverly, 183 La. 947, 165 So. 153 (1935); Jackson v. Cook,
176 So. 622 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937), reversed on granting of writs, 189 La. 860,
181 So. 195 (1938); see Davidson v. American Drug Stores, 175 So. 157 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1937) (concurring opinion); contra, Davidson v. American Drug
Stores (majority opinion) supra; Iglesias v. Campbell, 175 So. 145 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1937) ; McCormick & Co. v. Cauley, 168 So. 783 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936).
37. This conclusion is reached by reasoning: "What they can see they :nust
see and in legal contemplation they do see; that their failure to see what they
could have seen by the exercise of due diligence does not absolve them from
liability." Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860, 181 So. 195, 197 (1938). See, e.g.,
Burnett v. Marchand, 186 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966) ; Leon v. Jackson,
122 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960); Carlson v. Fidelity Mut. Ins. Co., 88
So. 2d 461 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956); Prine v. Continental So. Lines, 71 So. 2d
716 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) ; Soards v. Shreveport Rys., 8 So. 2d 343 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1942) ; Iglesias v. Campbell, 170 So. 265 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936).
38. Loftin v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 135 La. 33, 64 So. 972 (1914)
Harrison v. Louisiana W.R.R., 132 La. 761, 61 So. 782 (1913) ; Tatum v. Rock
Island A. &. L.R.R., 124 La. 921, 50 So. 796 (1909) ; May v. Texas & Pac.
Ry., 123 La. 647, 49 So. 272 (1909).
39. May v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 123 La. 647, 49 So. 272 (1909).
40. Jarrow v. City of New Orleans, 168 La. 992, 123 So. 651 (1929) ; Harri-
son v. Louisiana W.R.R., 132 La. 761, 61 So. 782 (1913) ; Jordan v. Katz &
Besthoff, 15 La. App. 500, 132 So. 380 (1931). Technically the new breach
restriction may be distinguished from the prior negligence limitation in that the
latter was used in cases where defendant was speeding or his engine was defec-
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clear chance cannot apply unless defendant failed to utilize his
later opportunity to avoid the accident.
These restrictions were superseded by the limitation that
last clear chance does not apply where the negligence of both
parties was concurrent and continuous and actually contributed
to the resulting injury.41  Harrison v. Louisiana W. R.R.42
illustrates the use of both concepts.43 An aged farmer, walking
along a railroad track late one afternoon, was struck from the
rear and killed by defendant's speeding train. Both the engineer
and the farmer were negligently unobservant. When the engi-
neer discovered the farmer's peril, it was too late to avoid the
accident. The farmer's wife was denied recovery, however, be-
cause the farmer had not noticed the train, so his negligence
continued to the instant of the injury. The court stated that
last clear chance would only apply if "the contributory negli-
gence of the person injured has not continued down to the
occurring of the accident, or, in other words, been concurrent
with that of the defendant at the very moment itself of acci-
dent." Then it added: "To warrant its application there must
have been some new breach of duty on the part of the defendant
subsequent to the plaintiff's negligence," (emphasis added) but
it found no new breach of duty by the engineer after he saw the
farmer.44
Courts experienced difficulty in distinguishing between what
tive, in which instances he was powerless at the time the peril arose to avert
it using due diligence at that moment. The new breach restriction has been
applied where both parties' negligence consists of inattention continuing until
it was too late to prevent the accident. In this regard the new breach restriction
is more closely related to the subsequent concurrent and continuous negligence
restriction.
41. See, e.g., Jarrow v. City of New Orleans, 168 La. 992, 123 So. 651
(1929) ; Thompson v. Morgan, 167 La. 335, 119 So. 69 (1928) ; Young v. Lou-
isiana W. Ry., 153 La. 129, 95 So. 511 (1923) ; Collery v. Morgan's L. & T. R.R.
& S.S. Co., 139 La. 763, 72 So. 222 (1916) ; Wolf v. New Orleans Ry. & Light
Co., 133 La. 891, 63 So. 392 (1913) ; Harrison v. Louisiana W.R.R., 132 La. 767,
61 So. 782 (191.3) ; Hammers v. Colorado S., N.O. & Pac. R.R., 128 La. 648, 55
So 4 (1911).
42. 132 La. 761, 61 So. 782 (1913).
43. See also Tatum v. Rock Island A. & L.R.R., 124 La. 921, 50 So. 796
(1909), where the court stated that plaintiff's "negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident, and bars recovery, although the defendant may have been
guilty of antecedent or concurrent negligence." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 926,
50 So. at 798.
44. Harrison v. Louisiana W.R.R., 132 La. 761, 766, 61 So. 782, 783 (1913).
The distinction between the restrictions of prior negligence (or new breach of
duty) and concurrent and continuous negligence was never recognized by the
judiciary, and, in adopting the continuous negligence concept, the earlier re-
strictions merely fell into disuse without being rejected outright. Consequently,
it is possible that prior negligence is yet a valid restriction to the applicability
of last clear chance in Louisiana. See note 70 infra.
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was and what was not concurrent and continuous negligence, 45
probably owing to the inaptness of the terms to express the type
of negligent conduct to which they referred. Concurrent and
continuous negligence as a bar to plaintiff's recovery was em-
ployed to accomplish the same end as the proposition that plain-
tiff's negligence must have placed him in a perilous position
from which he could not reasonably extricate himself before
last clear chance can apply; that is, defendant must have had
the last chance available to either party to avoid the injury. Use
of such terminology as "concurrent and continuous" merely
clouded the genuine limitation instilled within the doctrine at
its birth. The policy reason behind this limitation was probably
a hesitancy on the part of the courts to demand of defendant
a higher standard of care toward a negligent plaintiff than that
plaintiff shows for his own safety.46
It is likely that the very vagueness of the expression "con-
current and continuous negligence" greatly aided courts in elimi-
nating that restriction altogether. They obviously disliked the
requirement that plaintiff lose his case if his negligence con-
tinued to the moment of injury regardless of the seriousness of
defendant's negligence. And, it is not surprising that the con-
tinuous negligence limitation was circumvented by some later
courts by various techniques.4 1
45. State of intoxication not deemed continuous negligence. Blackburn v.
Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co., 144 La. 520, 80 So. 707 (1919) ; see also Grennon v.
New Orleans Pub. Service Inc., 10 La. App. 641, 120 So. 801 (1929). In Roder
v. Legendre, 147 La. 295, 84 So. 787 (1920), the court said failure to sound
horn was "concurrent" negligence. Compare Loftin v. Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co.,
135 La. 33, 64 So. 972 (1914), where the court said failure to blow whistle
"preceded" plaintiff's inattention.
46. See note 29 supra.
47. Some courts ignored the continuous negligence restriction altogether.
Duffy v. Hickey, 151 La. 274, 91 So. 733 (1922); Broussard v. Louisiana W.
Ry., 140 La. 517, 73 So. 606 (1916) ; Jones v. Mackey Tel. Cable Co., 137 La.
121, 68 So. 379 (1915) ; Guinn v. Kemp, 18 La. App. 3, 136 So. 764 (1931) ;
Norwood v. Bahm, 14 La. App. 261, 129 So. 183 (1930) ; Lanphier v. D'Antoni,
14 La. App. 441, 131 So. 682 (1930).
Some decisions enshrouded the issue in "proximate cause" language enabling
the court to conclude that plaintiff's negligence was not the legal cause of the
accident. Taylor v. Shreveport Yellow Cabs, 163 So. 737 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935),
where plaintiff was struck as he endeavored to cross a street. The court stated:
"Plaintiff's negligence did continue to the moment he was injured; but ...such
negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident." Thus last clear chance
applied. Id. at 740. Loewenberg v. Fidelity Union, Cas. Co., 147 So. 81 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1933). Other cases found plaintiff guilty of only "passive negligence,"
while defendant committed "active negligence" ; and so plaintiff's negligence was
not the proximate cause of his injury, and he could invoke last clear chance
against defendant. Blackburn v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 144 La. 520, 80 So.
708 (1918) ; Boullion v. Bonin, 2 So. 2d 535 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940), on rehear-
ing, 2 So. 2d 539 (1941), where the court's efforts at permitting recovery resulted
in near ludicrous reasoning; Harlow v. Owners' Auto. Ins. Co., 160 So. 169 (La.
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Rottman and Jackson Decisions Expanding the Doctrine
The concurrent and continuous negligence restriction was
partially dissolved by Rottman v. Beverly in 1935.48 A woman
was walking inattentively across a highway. Seeing her, but
thinking he could safely pass in front of her, defendant merely
slowed down and blew his horn. Noticing her failure to heed
his warning, he then braked and tried to guide his vehicle behind
her, but failed. The court found plaintiff "guilty of the grossest
kind of negligence." "But her negligence in that respect does
not bar recovery because the driver of the car unquestionably
had the last clear chance to avert the accident by making proper
use of available and adequate means," 9 since he actually saw
plaintiff's peril in ample time to avoid hitting her. The cases
upholding concurrent or continuing negligence as an exception
to the application of the doctrine were distinguished.
Rottman presents a thorough discussion of last clear chance,5 0
making it clear that the defense of concurrent negligence will
not bar plaintiff's recovery when defendant actually discovered
plaintiff's peril - an adoption of the "discovered peril doctrine."
After Rottman, the appellate courts split as to the applica-
tion of the rule, one following Rottman,5 1 while others ignored
App. 2d Cir. 1935); Grennon v. New Orleans Pub. Service, Inc., 10 La. App.
641, 120 So. 801 (1929).
In all cases, except Boullion v. Bonia, supra, there lacked mutuality of risks
between the parties; almost all of them involved a train or automobile striking
a pedestrian.
48. 183 La. 947, 165 So. 153 (1935).
49. Id. at 962, 165 So. at 158.
50. Id. at 954-55, 165 So. at 156: "Where the danger is brought about by
plaintiff's own negligence, but is not discovered by defendant, because of a
failure to exercise due care, the parties are on equal footing. Their faults are
mutual, their negligence is concurrent. It arises from the same cause, viz., failure
to observe. The negligence of each party is a contributing cause of thq accident.
In such case it cannot be determined whether the negligence of the plaintiff or
that of the defendant was the proximate and immediate cause of the injury, and
neither party can recover .... The first duty of those who operate engines or
motor vehicles is to keep a sharp lookout ahead to discover the presence of those
who might be in danger. If they perform that duty and discover that someone is
in danger, then a second duty arises, and that is to use every possible available
means to avert the injury. If the defendant fails to perform that duty, . .. the
last clear chance doctrine applies even though plaintiff's negligence continues up
to the accident ... "
Id. at 956-57, 165 So. 156-57: "If he could have averted the accident by the
exercise of due diligence and failed to do so, his negligence in that respect is
considered the proximate cause and immediate cause of the injury, and plaintiff
may recover although his negligence continued to the instant of the accident.
The basis of recovery in such cases is the defendant's superior knowledge of the
peril and his ability to avoid the injury. He has the last clear chance." (Emphasis
added.)
51. Jackson v. Cook, 176 So. 622 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937), reversed, 189 La.
860, 181 So. 195 (1938).
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its restriction and applied the broader rule that concurrent or
continuous negligence will not preclude plaintiff's recovery if
defendant either saw or should have seen the peril in time to
avert the injury.52
The conflict was soon resolved by Jackson v. Cook5 3 in favor
of the broader rule, thus completing the break begun by Rottman
from the concurrent and continuing negligence restriction. In
Jackson, an inebriate was staggering along the shoulder of a
road at night. The driver of the automobile, partially blinded
by the lights of oncoming cars, did not see the man until he
appeared directly in front of the car. The driver acted reason-
ably at that instant but could not avoid the man. The court of
appeal applied the Rottman rule and found for defendant. 4
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Rottman was not
applicable and remarking:
"The mere fact that the driver of the car in this case did not
see plaintiff does not absolve the defendant from liability,
because it was the duty of the driver to look, and according
to the findings of both courts, he was not looking. The Rott-
man Case is not authority for holding that, merely because
the driver of the car in this case did not actually see the
plaintiff, the defendant is not liable."55
Jackson substantively shaped the doctrine of last clear chance
in Louisiana as it stands today. Whenever both plaintiff and
defendant are negligent and their negligence is a cause of plain-
tiff's injury, plaintiff's negligence will not preclude recovery
if defendant appreciated plaintiff's peril or would have done so
had he used reasonable care and attention at a time when he
could have prevented the injury by reasonable use of the means
available to him. This is also referred to as the apparent peril
doctrine (as distinguished from the discovered peril doctrine of
52. Davidson v. American Drug Stores, 175 So. 157 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937) ;
Iglesias v. Campbell, 175 So. 145 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937) ; McCormick & Co. v.
Cauley, 168 So. 783 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936).
A further shadow was cast upon Rottman in Hicks v. Texas & New Orleans
Ry., 186 La. 1008, 173 So. 745 (1937). A woman was struck as she stepped onto
a track in front of an oncoming "motor car." Her negligence in being unaware
continued to the moment of the accident. The court allowed recovery, finding
that the engineer could have seen the woman earlier, and then it added that even
after seeing her, the motor car (traveling 12-13 m.p.h.) went another twenty feet
before the brakes were effectively applied. Thus, the engineer failed to use due
care and was held liable under last clear chance by alternative reasoning.
53. 189 La. 860, 181 So. 195 (1938).
54. Jackson v. Cook, 176 So. 622 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937).
55. 189 La. 860, 869, 181 So. 195, 198 (1938).
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Rottman) because it will apply against defendant if plaintiff's
peril was apparent to a reasonable man, although defendant him-
self did not discover it.
However, too much reliance must not be placed on the Jackson
formula. The full effect of Jackson had not consistently been
recognized, and it has been made subject to certain questionable
limitations. The rule itself has not been altered, only its applica-
tion in certain cases, as will be discussed in the following sec-
tion. 57
III. APPLICATION OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE IN LOUISIANA:
PROBLEM AREAS
Only after it has been determined that the negligence of both
plaintiff and defendant was a cause of plaintiff's injury does
last clear chance become crucial. The application of the doctrine
is a question of fact;55s thus each case must rest upon its own
findings. 59 Since plaintiff is urging application of the doctrine,
56. Jackson has made the Louisiana rule of last clear chance broader than
most other jurisdictions. See PROSSER § 65; RESTATEMENT, TORTS 2 D §§ 479,
480 (1965).
57. See text accompanying note 83 infra. The real significance of Jackson
remains unclear. Both Rottman and Jackson involved injury by a motorist to a
pedestrian, and courts appear more sympathetic toward l)edestrians than other
plaintiffs in these cases. Furthermore, plaintiff in Jackson was helpless, and so
his state might prevent his negligence from being classed as continuous. Thus it
can be argued that Jackson merely reiterated the earlier rule that plaintiff, help-
less in peril, may recover under last clear chance even if defendlnt did not dis-
cover his peril, and applied it to automobile cases. See note 45 supra. But the
court in Jackson chose to find plaintiff's negligence iras continuous and con-
current with defendant's and resolve the question of plaintiff's continuous neg-
ligence being a bar to recovery. Some cases, however, have interpreted Jackson
as merely stating the rule that' a motorist can be liable under the doctrine to a
helpless pedestrain, even if the motorist (lid not discover his peril. See James v.
United States, 252 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Bergeron v. I)epartment of High-
ways, 221 La. 595, 60 So. 2d 4 (1052) ; Dupuy v. Veazey, 63 So. 2d 756 (L.a. App.
Orl. Cir. 1953). See also The llork of the ILouisiana 8iipremte Court for the
1940-19411 Term -Torts, 4 LA. L. REV. 211 (1942).
If the full impact of Jackson were accepted, that decision would dissolve the
defense of contributory negligence in these cases. For this reason perhaps Jackson
should apply only when plaintiff is helpless or when a pedestrian is struck by an
automobile.
58. See Coonce v. Corley, 162 So. 2d 405 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) ; McCarthy
v. Blair, 122 So. 2d 837, 840 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960), where the court stated:
"No citation of authority is needed in support of the principle that under the
last clear chance doctrine each case must be decided in the light of its own
peculiar facts and circumstances."
59. Primarily for this reason these cases are frequently distinguished but
never overruled. This is probably a factor causing the lack of clarity and harmony
in these cases, as one court candidly admitted: Short v. Boise Valley Traction
Co., 38 Idaho 593, 599, 225 Pac. 398, 399 (1924) : " '[it is probably a hope-
less task, and an unprofitable one.' to undertake a discussion or an analysis of all
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he must prove all the facts indicating that defendant did have
the last clear chance.60 This, in most cases becomes a technical
question involving "various calculations of the rate of speed, of
the time it takes to react to an emergency and the application
of brakes as well as the distance in which a . . . [given vehicle]
can be brought to a stop, traveling at a given speed." 61
Whether the defendant had a chance to avoid the accident
involves time, distance, and control, as well as the nature of
the defendant's negligent conduct.0 2 Whenever, at the instant
the defendant appreciated or should have appreciated the plain-
tiff's peril, he could possibly do something to prevent the acci-
dent, he has a chance. Conversely, he has no chance when the
peril is so sudden that a reasonable person could have done
nothing to avoid the injury.63
Where defendant is incapable of discovering plaintiff's peril
in time or of averting a discovered peril because his vehicle
has some defect or malfunction or where he is speeding, the
conclusion is compelling that he really has no chance to avoid
plaintiff. Such neglects may be termed acts of prior or ante-
cedent negligence rendering defendant helpless to act effective-
ly. 64 In such instances the strongest policy considerations under-
the cases . . . [invoking] last clear chance .... .It would he impossible to
harmonize them, and we find it impossible to appreciate the hair-splitting dis-
tinctions that some of them draw in dealing with facts disclosed in . . . [these
cases]."
60. See, e.g., Franievich v. Lirette, 241 La. 466, 129 So. 2d 740 (1961)
Coleman v. Mason, 174 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Jones v. Dozier,
160 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Angeron v. Guzzino, 140 So. 2d 669
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Fontenot v. Travelers Indem. Co., 134 So. 2d 330 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Norwood v. Bahm, 14 La. App. 261, 129 So. 183 (1930).
61. Bergeron v. Department of Highways, 221 La. 595, 605, 60 So. 2d 4, 8
(1952). The court further introduced the sentiment that "the doctrine . . . is
one involving nice distinctions, often of a technical nature, andi courts should be
wary in extending its application." Id. at 606, 60 So. 2d at 8. This attitude has
been reiterated in a number of later decisions. See, e.g., Moore v. American Ins.
Co. of Newark, N.J., 150 So. 2d 346 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963); Angeron v.
Guzzino, 140 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Ballard v. Piebler, 98 So. 2d
273 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
62. Strictly speaking, any act of antecedent or prior negligence by defendant
(e.g., speeding, defective brakes, no headlight) could preclude his having any
chance at the instant of the peril.
63. E.g., Musco v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1966) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 157 So. 2d 302 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963); Knighten v. Travelers Indem. Co., 127 So. 2d 51 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1961) ; Sixkiller v. Pretchter, 118 So. 2d 698 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960)
Hutchinson v. Texas & N.O.Ry., 33 So. 2d 139 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).
64. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, 1253-55; James, Last Clear Chance: A Transi-
tional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704, 714-15 (1938).
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lying last clear chance do not support the conclusion that de-
fendant should be liable to plaintiff. Defendant's negligence is
not later in time, so plaintiff will have a better, or at least equal,
opportunity to avoid the accident. It is submitted that one
rational basis"5 for holding a defendant who was guilty of prior
negligence liable would be found in cases that lack mutuality of
risk - that is, where defendant's negligent conduct presented a
likelihood of substantially more serious consequences than that of
plaintiff. Where the accident is between two automobiles, there
is mutuality of risk and equal fault; for each owes the other
the same duty and each one's negligence exposes the other to
the same degree of risk and to equally serious injury. In this
instance, courts tend to let the risk fall where it may and deny
both parties recovery. 0
Rottman67 and Jackson" are not contrary to the position that
last clear chance cannot apply when defendant was helpless to
avoid the accident owing to some act of prior negligence on
his part.69 While no modern cases have expressly recognized
prior negligence as a limitation to the application of the doc-
65. It does not seem unlikely that acts of prior negligence will also be handled
by the courts under last clear chance, even though those acts do not really fit
the formula for the doctrine, because many times the one guilty of prior negligence
is the worse wrongdoer. For example, society probably feels it is more repre-
hensible for one to knowingly drive with faulty brakes than to be momentarily
inattentive. If this be done, the courts should recognize this as an appendage to
last clear chance and not try to fit it under the present rule. Alternatively, the
question could be solved without invoking last clear chance by the application
of the principle of wilful and wanton misconduct. Thereby defendant can be held
liable notwithstanding plaintiff's negligence when defendant's operation of a
vehicle with some known defect would be tantamount to wilful injury or reck-
lessness.
66. Of some thirty-five cases surveyed in which two automobiles were in-
volved and last clear chance was put at issue, negligent plaintiffs recovered in
only four cases under the doctrine. These cases indicate the hesitancy on part of
the judiciary in allowing plaintiff recovery for an injury caused initially - if not
primarily - by his own negligence. See, e.g., Hebert v. Travelers Ins. Co., 179
So. 2d 513 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) ; Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
148 So. 2d 126 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962); Angeron v. Guzzino, 140 So. 2d 669
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Gage v. Nesser, 119 So. 2d 98 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1960); Whitner v. Scott, 116 So. 2d 180 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959); Baker v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 13 So. 2d 65 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943). See also Burden v.
Capitol Stores, 200 La. 329, 8 So. 2d 45 (1942) ; Zorick v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
172 So. 2d 706 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965) ; Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.
v. George Minor & Sons, 171 So. 2d 703 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1065). In these cases
both drivers were negligent, but last clear chance was not mentioned.
67. 183 La. 947, 165 So. 153 (1935) see text accompanying note 48 supra.
68. 189 La. 860, 181 So. 195 (1938) see text accompanying note 53 supra.
69. See note 44 supra.
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trine,70 neither have any expressly rejected that early restric-
tion.71
The plaintiff must prove defendant's chance was not only a
possible one but a clear one "that a reasonably prudent man,
placed in a like position, could and would have acted with ef-
fectiveness. ' 72 Testimony arousing speculation that the chance
was clear will not discharge that burden.73 This point has
caused the courts difficulty, and the cases are discouragingly
inconsistent. 74
70. But see Hebert v. Travelers Ins. Co., 179 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1965); Pate v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 147 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1962) Thomas v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 146 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962) Angeron v. Guzzino, 140 So. 2d 669 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958) ; Dupre v.
Union Prod. Co., 49 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950). See also Bagala v.
Kimble, 225 La. 943, 74 So. 2d 172 (1954) (on rehearing) ; Garcia v. Anchor
Cas. Co., 148 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Guidry v. United States Cas.
Co., 134 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 96 So. 2d 340 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957).
71. But see Broussard v. Louisiana W. Ry., 140 La. 517, 73 So. 606 (1916)
McGuire v. Vicksburg, S. & P.R.R., 46 La. Ann. 1543, 16 So. 457 (1894) ; Kelly
v. Neff, 14 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943) ; Boullion v. Bonin, 2 So. 2d 535
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1940) ; Davidson v. American Drug Stores, 175 So. 157 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1937) ; Guinn v. Kemp, 18 La. App. 3, 136 So. 764 (1931) ; Nor-
wood v. Bahn, 14 La. App. 261, 129 So. 183 (1930) ; Abate v. Hirdes, 121 So.
775 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1928).
72. Hebert v. Meibaum, 19 So. 2d 629, 637 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944) (on
rehearing), aff'd, 209 La. 156, 24 So. 2d 297 (1945). See also Dean v. Pitts,
133 So. 2d 917 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; Warner v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
of Texas, 110 So. 2d 842 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) ; cf. Poncino v. Reid-Murdock
& Co., 136 Cal. App. 223, 28 P.2d 932 (1934).
73. Hebert v. Travelers Ins. Co., 179 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965)
Angeron v. Guzzino, 140 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Phares v. Biggs,
135 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
74. This writer makes no attempt to achieve the bold, if not impossible, task
of reconciling the mass of cases considering whether or not defendant had a rea-
sonable opportunity to avoid plaintiff.
Confusing the question of last clear chance with other issues has been one
source of difficulty. See Burvant v. Wolfe, 126 La. 787, 52 So. 1025 (1910),
where a boy, crossing a street, was struck by a motorist who never saw the boy.
The court held the motorist liable because of his failure to see the boy, adding:
"Possibly it would, even then, have been too late; but defendant should have been
sufficiently attentive to have been in a position to make the trial." Id. at 791,
52 So. at 1027. Similarly, in Broussard v. Louisiana W. Ry., 140 La. 517, 73
So. 606 (1916), a speeding train struck a car which carelessly tried to cross the
tracks. The court held the railroad liable even though the train could not have
been stopped before striking the car had it been going at the lawful speed, stating
that had the train been going more slowly perhaps the driver of the car would
have noticed its presence in time for him to avoid the danger. In both of these
cases plaintiff appears to have failed to prove that defendant's negligence was a
cause in fact of the accident. See also Iglesias v. Campbell, 170 So. 265 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1936). Proximate cause language has occasionally been used to impose
liability on defendant when plaintiff could not recover under last clear chance.
In Boullion v. Bonin, 2 So. 2d 535 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940), two vehicles collided
in an intersection, defendant having the right of way. Neither party saw the
other; in addition, defendant was speeding. The court held defendant liable upon
deciding that "the negligence of . . . [plaintiff] was not active and continuous
up to the moment of the accident and was not concurrent with that of . . .
[defendant], but his negligence became inactive when the collision occurred,"
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One problem is the case where defendant delayed momen-
tarily before attempting to avoid plaintiff. A delay of less than
one second has been found unreasonable,7 5 but the view that a
second's delay does not constitute negligence is preferable, 76 for
a normal man requires almost one second to respond to an ob-
served situation.7 7  Further, to attempt to make fine calcula-
tions of time based on rough and inaccurate estimates of dis-
tances is unsound.
Failure to give special warning to someone approaching a
railroad track has been found to be failure to employ a rea-
sonable chance to avert the injury.7 8  Similarily, the argument
has usually been sustained in railroad accident cases that though
defendant could not have stopped after he reasonably should
have realized plaintiff's danger, he might have given plainitff
sufficient time to remove himself from danger had he applied
his brakes sooner.79 The analogous argument that defendant
while "the negligence of . . . [defendant] was not only active and continuous
up to the moment of the collision but it was the direct and proximate cause of it."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 540-41. Certainly plaintiff's negligence was as proxi-
mate to his injury as defendant's. Compare Musco v. General Guar. Ins. Co.,
181 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Clark v. Shannon, 120 So. 2d 307
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1960); Wheat v. Brandt, 61 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1952); cf. Harlow v. Owners' Auto. Ins. Co., 160 So. 169 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1935).
75. Hicks v. Texas & N.O.Ry., 186 La. 1008, 173 So. 745 (193 7 ) (alter-
natively, by implication).
76. Fendlason v. Allstate Ins. Co., 136 So. 2d 814 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961)
Solomon v. Davis Bus Line, 1 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941).
77. Courts take judicial notice that 3/4 of a second is the time it takes one
to respond to an emergency. Biggs v. Verbois, 151 So. 2d 172 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1963) ; Moore v. American Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 150 So. 2d 346 (La. App.
Ist Cir. 1963) ; Dupre v. Union Prod. Co., 49 So. 2d 655.(La. App. 1st Cir. 1950).
See also 9B BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE 408
(1954) ; Comment, 25 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 13, 32-34 (1956).
78, Ross v. Sibley, L. B. & S. Ry., 116 La. 789, 41 So. 93 (1906) ; Wheadon
v. Porter, 69 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953) ; Browne v. Texas & Pac. R.R.,
193 So. 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939). These cases indicate a defendant must give
warning so as to provide plainUif with a reasonable chance to appreciate his
own danger and remove himself.
The mere sounding of a whistle, however, does not per se discharge defendant's
duty to utilize all means to prevent the accident. See Russo v. Texas & Pac. R.R.,
189 La. 1042, 181 So. 485 (1938) ; Jones v. Mackay Tel. Cable Co., 137 La. 121,
68 So. 379 (1915).
79. See Jones v. Mackay Tel. Cable Co., 137 La. 121, 68 So. 379 (1915)
Ross v. Sibley, L. B. & S. Ry., 116 La. 789, 41 So. 93 '(1906) ; O'Connor v.
Chicago, 11.I. & Pac. Ry., 40 So. 2d 663 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949) ; Browne v.
Texas & Pac. R.R., 193 So. 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) ; cf. Broussard v. Lou-
isiana W. Ry., 140 La. 517, 73 So. 606 (1916), discussed in note 74 supra.
But see Brown v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 234 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1956);
Eggleston v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 192 So. 774 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939). The
difficulty with this argument is that it is often mere speculation, and it requires
the court to conduct technical calculations from the inaccurate testimony of wit-
nesses. Cf. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 So. 2d 126 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1962).
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automobile driver should have swerved more and missed plain-
tiff has generally not been followed. 0 Other decisions involve
traffic situations in which defendant is unable to ascertain which
of several courses of action will effectively prevent an accident.8'
Without proof that defendant's reaction was imprudent, he
should not be held liable because he guessed wrong or because
his response to an emergency created by plaintiff's negligence
was not as wise or effecitve as it might have been.8 2
Since it is plaintiff whose negligence has usually created the
emergency, the mere fact that defendant fails to avoid him
should create no presumption of negligence on defendant's part.
Again, the question is not whether defendant might have acted
so as to avoid hitting planitiff, but rather whether defendant's
80. See, e.g., Davis v. Lewis & Lewis, 226 La. 1064, 78 So. 2d 174 (1954);
Burnett v. Marchand, 186 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Whitfield v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 160 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1.964) ; Knighten v. Travel-
ers Indem. Co., 127 So. 2d 51 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; Arline v. Alexander, 2
So. 2d 710 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941). But see Palmisano v. Ryan, 136 So. 2d 173
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; cf. Kelly v. Neff, 14 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1943).
81. These cases involve headon collisions between two vehicles, where plaintiff
has negligently crossed over into defendant's lane, leaving him with the unhappy
choice of driving his car off the road and possibly injuring himself, asserting his
right to that lane in hopes plaintiff will realize the danger and cut his car back
onto his own side, or turning his car into plaintiff's lane, hoping plaintiff
will not 'become aware of his negligence and turn back into that lane. See Davis
v. Lewis & Lewis, 226 La. 1064, 78 So. 2d 174 (1954) ; Tanner v. Texas & Pac.
Ry., 135 So. 2d 361 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Guidry v. United States Cas. Co.,
134 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Gage v. Nesser, 119 So. 2d 98 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1960); Litton v. Samuel, 98 So. 2d 534 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954)
Muse v. Gulf Refining Co., 8 So. 2d 330 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942); Bazile v.
J. F. Landry & Co., 122 So. 901 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929) ; Kennedy v. Opden:
weyer, 121 So. 363 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929). While the effectiveness of any
action by defendant depends upon the future action of plaintiff which defendant
cannot predetermine, in a suit between them the court need not suffer from
indecision. The test to defendant's liability is whether he acted reasonably under
the circumstances. In these cases, none of the alternatives open to defendant
seem unreasonable. But see Prevost v. Smith, 197 So. 905 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1940).
82. Almost all last clear chance cases arise out of sudden emergency situations
where one's actions are often spontaneous reflexes. The reasonableness of the
action taken is the primary factor in determining negligence. Since time pre-
vents full contemplation of all possible courses of action, latitude must be af-
forded the actor in determining the reasonableness of the course taken. The "rea-
sonable man test" thus becomes tempered by constructively placing that ideal
being in those same circumstances. If his response is not found to be unreason-
able, last clear chance does not become an issue, since the actor is not negligent.
See, e.g., Bagala v. Kimble, 225 La. 943, 74 So. 2d 172 (1954) ; Jones v. Sibley,
L.B. & S.R.R., 121 La. 39, 46 So. 61 (1.908) ; Burnett v. Marchand, 186 So. 2d
383 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Welch v. Welch, 169 So. 2d 713 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964) ; Myers v. Maricelli, 50 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; lebert
v. Meibaum, 19 So. 2d 629 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944) (on rehearing), aff'd, 209
La. 156, 24 So. 2d 297 (1945) ; Muse v. Gulf Refining Co., 8 So. 2d 330 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1942) ; Arline v. Alexander, 2 So. 2d 710 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941) ; Clark
v. DeBeer, 188 So. 517 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939). See also Prevost v. Smith, 197
So. 905 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
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course of action was reasonable. Plaintiff must not only prove
that defendant acted unreasonably, but also that any reasonable
course of action would have prevented the accident. A clear
chance does not mean only a reasonable chance, but that every
reasonable alternatvie open to defendant must have been one
that would have effectively averted the injury.
That defendant's chance should also be the last opportunity
available to either party to avert the injury was the purpose
of the earlier limitations to last clear chance, which Rottman
and Jackson undertook to eliminate.83 The Jackson rule may
have clarified the law in 1938, but its liberality has also cre-
ated problems. For example: Driver A, unobservant, collides
with unobservant driver B in an intersection where A had the
legal right of way. B sues A, relying on last clear chance. Jack-
son indicates that B might recover,14 reasoning that had A been
attentive, he probably would have noticed, in sufficient time
to avoid him, that B was inattentive and was not going to stop.
Such a decision would be a perversion of the policy considera-
tions supporting last clear chance. B was certainly more at
fault; he was negligent both in being inattentive and in failing
to yield the legal right of way. A had a right to assume that B
would stop for him, and thus his standard of care was relaxed.85
A's conduct was no more hazardous than B's; nor was it later
in time.86
These considerations, and the fear that continued liberaliza-
tion of last clear chance might destroy the defense of contribu-
tory negligence, have caused the courts to shy away from the
full import of Jackson. As a result, B above would probably not
be permitted to recover.8 7 The courts employ various language
83. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
84. A few cases have applied the broad Jackson rule and permitted recovery
in -this type situation. See Galliot v. Chisholm, 126 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1960); Boullion v. Bonin, 2 So. 2d 535 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
85. See, e.g., Kientz v. Charles Dennery, 209 La. 144, 22 So. 2d 292 (1945)
Whitner v. Scott, 116 So. 2d 180 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) ; Moore v. Shreveport
Transit Co., 115 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959) ; Carlson v. Fidelity Mut.
& Ins. Co., 88 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) ; Jones v. American Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co., 189 So. 169 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939) Clark v. DeBeer, 188 So. 517
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1939); Buckley v. Featherstone Garage, 11 La. App. 564,
123 So. 446 (1929).
86. Here also, each exposes the other to the same risks: there is mutuality
of risks. There appears to be no reason for the rule of contributory negligence
not to apply to bar plaintiff's recovery. See Burden v. Capitol Stores, 200 La.
329, 8 So. 2d 45 (1942) ; Zorick v. Maryland Cas. Co., 172 So. 2d 706 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1965).
87. See, e.g., Hebert v. Travelers Ins. Co., 179 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1965) ; Scott v. Glazer, 164 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; Ageron v.
19671
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in denying recovery in this and similar situations where it seems
unable to find any policy reasons why defendant alone should
bear the whole loss."' One example is when last clear chance is
describe das a "two-edged sword" which defendant as well as
plaintiff may wield.80 As a result, there are cases holding that
the plaintiff cannot recover because it was he who had the last
clear chance.9 0 At other times courts find plaintiff had a chance
"equal to"' 1 or "better than ' 9 2 that of defendant to avoid the
accident and conclude that last clear chance cannot apply in
plaintiff's favor.
Probably the most authoritative concept to deny recovery is
the "superior knowledge test."93 This criterion of last chance
Guzzino, 140 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Clark v. Shannon, 120 So. 2d
307 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) ; Harrell v. Goodwin, 32 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1947). In many more cases the courts refused to specifically hold defendant
negligent in failing to appreciate plaintiff's impending peril timely. See, e.g.,
Musco v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966);
Whitfield v, Travelers Ins. Co., 160 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Wil-
liams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 So. 2d 126 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962);
Whitner v. Scott, 116 So. 2d 180 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
88. Cf. Scott v. Glazer, 164 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), involving
a two-car collision. The court concluded: "There is no more justification for
holding that the defendant driver had the last clear chance than there is for
holding that the plaintiff had the last clear chance." Id. at 187. See also Young
v. Thempson, 189 So. 487, 492 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939).
89. This language was introduced in Bergeron v. Department of Highways,
221 La. 595, 607, 60 So. 2d 4, 8 (1952), and reiterated in a number of subse-
quent cases. See, e.g., Tauzier v. Bondio, 237 La. 516, 111 So. 2d 756 (1959) ;
Kraft v. U. Koen & Co.. 188 So. 2d 203 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966) ; LeBlanc v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 162 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Emmco Ins.
Co. v. Employers Mut. Co., 150 So. 2d 338 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963); Dean v.
Pitts, 133 So. 2d 917 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; Wheat v. Brandt, 61 So. 2d 238
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1952). While this approach offers the advantages of clarity
and simplicity, it is doubtful last clear chance was intended as a weapon in the
hands of defendant, if one accepts the premise that the doctrine is only intended
to be an escape from the effects of contributory negligence on part of plaintiff.
See note 124 infra, and preceding text.
90.. See Brown v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 135 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. La.
1955), aff'd, 234 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Tauzier v. Bondio, 237 La. 516,
111 So. 2d 756 (1959) ; Bergeron v. Department of Highways, 221 La. 595, 60
So. 2d 4 (1952) ; Barnhill v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 109 La. 43, 33 So. 63 (1902) ;
Short v. City of Baton Rouge, 110 So. 2d 825 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) ; Matthews
v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 45 So. 2d 547 (La. App. OrL. Cir. 1950) ; Levy v.
New Orleans & N.E.R.R., 20 So. 2d 559 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945) ; Murphy v.
City of Alexandria, 2 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941).
91. See Harrison v. Louisiana W.R.R., 132 La. 761, 61 So. 782 (1913)
Blackwell v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 47 La. Ann. 268, 16 So. 818 (1895)
LeBlanc v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 162 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964);
Solomon v. Davis Bus Line, 1 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941) ; Eggleston v.
Louisiana & Ark. By., 192 So. 774 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
92. See, e.g., Tauzier v. Bondio, 237 La. 516, 111 So. 2d 756 (1959) ; Dean v.
Pitts, 133 So. 2d 917 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); Matthews v. New Orleans
Terminal Co., 45 So. 2d 547 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950) ; Levy v. New Orleans &
N.E.R.R., 20 So. 2d 559 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945). See also cases listed in note
90 supra.
93. See, e.g., Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Butler, 318 F.2d 67 (5th Cir.
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traces its ancestry to Rottman, where the court stated: "The
basis of recovery in such cases is the defendant's superior knowl-
edge of the peril and his ability to avoid the injury.' 94 (Empha-
sis added.) Akin to the superior knowledge concept are state-
ments that defendant must have a later opportunity or a later
chance9 5 to avoid the accident before last clear chance can apply
against him. Such language evidences modern judicial efforts
at confining the doctrine to the scope pronounced in Rottman.
It is noteworthy that this language is generally employed in
cases not involving pedestrians or trains. It is usually resorted
to where mutuality of risk can be found from the conduct of
the parties; unsurprisingly, the requisite of last opportunity has
largely been ignored in cases involving pedestrians.", This indi-
cates that courts tend to treat pedestrian cases differently from
those involving two motor vehicles.
As one can see, the decisions regarding the element of last
chance remain confused. It seems that the requisite that de-
fendant's chance be the last one available to either party was
founded upon the principle that the last wrongdoer is the one
more at fault.9 7 Since in almost every case in which last clear
chance has been applied it was defendant who struck plaintiff,5
this notion may yet have substantial effect. But the basis of
the last wrongdoer notion was primarily that defendant's later
1963) ; Tanner v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 135 So. 2d 361 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ;
Service Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 854
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957); Carlson v. Fidelity Mut. Ins. Co., 88 .So. 2d 461
(La App. 2d Cir. 1956) ; Hanks v. Arkansas & La. Mo. Ry., 62 So. 2d 139 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1952) ;Boullion v. Bonin, 2 So. 2d 535 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
94. Rottman v. Beverly, 183 La. 947, 956, 165 So. 153, 156 (1935).
95. See Kansas City So. R.R. v. ElIzey. 275 U.S. 236 (1927); Employers
Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Butler, 318 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Lapuyade v.-Pacific
Employers Ins. Co., 202 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Service Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y.
v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 854 (l.a. App. Orl. Cir. 1957).
96. See Belshe v. Gant, 235 La. 17, 102 So. 2d 477 (1958) ; Taylor v. Kendall,
162 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Ingrain v. McCorkle, 121 So. 2d 303
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ; Dick v. Page, 77 So. 2d 209 (La. App. Or]. Cir. 1955) ;
Prine v. Continental So. Lines, 71 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 2d Cir. 195-1) ; Moore v.
Nola Cabs, Inc., 70 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1954) ; Breaux v. Barichnivich,
49 So. 2d 651 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950); Neyrey v. Maillet, 21 So. 2d 158 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1945).
97. See notes 18 and 19 supra, and accompanying text.
98. The only exception to this is some cases involving an accident between
a left turning vehicle and an overtaking vehicle (plaintiff) which was in the
process of passing the other at the moment the left turn was attempted. See
Cassar v. Mansfield Lbr. Co., 215 La. 533, 41 So. 2d 209 (1949); Hollabaugh-
Seale Funeral Home v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 215 La. 545, 41 So. 2d 212 (1949) ;
Burns v. Evans Cooperage Co., 208 La. 406, 23 So. 2d 165 (1945) ; McCallum v.
Adkerson, 126 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; Parker v. Home Indem. Co.'
of N.Y., 41 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949). See note 11 infra, and accom-
panying text for discussion of these cases.
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negligence was more to blame in those situations where plain-
tiff was helpless.29 Where plaintiff is not helpless, defendant
is not the last wrongdoer; plaintiff's wrongdoing continues to
the instant of injury. Thus, defendant never has the last chance
in a strict sense so long as plaintiff might extricate himself,
and his negligence cannot be deemed more wrongful than plain-
tiff's on the ground that it is the last wrongful conduct. If the
rule of last clear chance is to sustain its meaning, the concept
of last chance must be retained, at least where there can be said
to exist mutuality of risks created by both parties' conduct; the
judicial efforts to this end are worthy even though the judicial
reasoning might be clearer.
Negligence and Last Clear Chance
Types and Seriousness of Negligence. In a number of in-
stances the jurisprudence has distinguished between active and
passive negligence. Passive negligence is conduct by one who
has lost capacity to remedy the perilous situation; for example,
one drunk and asleep in a dangerous place.100 Active negligence
is unreasonable action by one who has normal control of his
faculties. Under the present rule, however, there appears no
need to retain this distinction, for the plaintiff may recover
whether his negligence is passive or active, 10 1 and so the dis-
tinction should be discontinued. Notwithstanding, some recent
cases still speak in those terms. 10 2 As a practical matter a plain-
tiff has a much stronger case under last clear chance if he was
helpless rather than inattentivw. 10 3
99. See FLEMING 218-21; James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine,
47 YALE L.J. 704-08, 709-12 (1938) ; cf. Poncino v. Reid-Murdock & Co., 136
Cal. App. 223, 227, 28 P.2d 932, 934 (1934).
100. Blackburn v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 144 La. 520, 80 So. 708 (1919)
Rector v. Allied Van Lines, 198 So. 516 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940) ; Shipp v. St.
Louis S.W. Ry., 188 So. 526 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939). But see Shaw v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 39 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. La. 1941), where the court found that the
pedestrian may have been intoxicated but not so helpless to render his negligence
passive. Negligence of mother in allowing four-year-old child to go into street held
passive, Abate v. Hirdes, 121 So. 775 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1928). Negligent
placing or leaving of an inanimate object held passive negligence, Morris v. Clark,
199 So. 437 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940) ; Canal Steel Works v. City of New Orleans,
121 So. 773 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1928). See also Boullion v. Bonin, 2 So. 2d 535
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1940) ; Harlow v. Owners' Auto. Ins. Co., 160 So. 169 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1935). These two cases broadened the concept of passive negligence
to include mere inattentiveness.
101. See Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860, 181 So. 195 (1938) ; Rottman v.
Beverly, 183 La. 947, 165 So. 153 (1935).
102. See, e.g., Gregoire v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 158 So. 2d 379 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1963) ; Dupuy v. Veazey, 63 So. 2d 756 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953) ; Boullion
v. Bonin, 2 So. 2d 535 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940) (on rehearing).
103. The writer has found but one type circumstance when plaintiff, guilty
[Vol. XXVII
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There are kinds of negligent conduct that are more repre-
hensible to society than others. For example, it is more repug-
nant to society's standards for one to drive 25 mph over the
speed limit than to exceed it by five mph, even though the driver
may be negligent in both instances. Louisiana courts recognize
this sentiment by characterizing conduct which falls far below
the reasonable standard of care as "gross negligence." 10 4 One
might expect that the seriousness of the negligent conduct in-
volved would especially affect the outcome of last clear chance
cases, since the doctrine is in one sense only a balancing of
fault. But a finding that plaintiff was grossly negligent will
not preclude his recovery under last clear chance, 10 5 and so such
labeling appears to have no legal effect.
Appreciating Plaintiff's Peril. The basis for plaintiff's re-
covery under last clear chance is simply that defendant failed
to avoid him under circumstances in which a reasonable man
would have done so. It is only necessary for the defendant to
be proved negligent in one general sense- he failed to avail
himself of the reasonable chance he had.1°0 The reasons for this
failure are varied; especially troublesome are cases where de-
fendant did not appreciate plaintiff's peril in time. Failure to
appreciate a peril when a reasonable man would have done so
will constitute negligence, which will render defendant liable
if it prevented him from utilizing the last clear chance he had.
of passive negligence, has not been permitted to recover. This is when the ac-
cident has occurred in a rural area where defendant could not be held to antici-
pate the presence of someone helpless in his path. See Tyler v. Gulf, C. & S.F.
Ry., 143 La. 177, 78 So. 438 (1918) ; Rogers v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 143
La. 58, 78 So. 237 (1918) ; Courtney v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 133 La. 360,
63 So. 48 (1913) ; Gregoire v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 158 So. 2d 379 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1963).
104. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 144 La. 520, 80 So.
708 (1919); Lavigne v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 125 So. 2d 430
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1960) ; Service Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Houston Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1957) ; Montault v. Bradford, 79 So. 2d
601 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955) ; Myers v. Maricelli, 59 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1951) ; Williams v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 11 So.2d 658 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1942).
105. See Blackburn v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 144 La. 520, 80 So. 708
(1919) ; Williams v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 11 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) ;
Law v. Osterland, 3 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941); Browne v. Texas &
Pac. R.R., 193 So. 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) ; Shipp v. St. Louis S.W. Ry.,
188 So. 526 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939). In each of these cases the plaintiff guilty
of "gross" negligence was a pedestrian, and all but Law v. Osterland involved
trains.
106. Occasionally a court will (1) determine that plaintiff was negligent,
(2) see if defendant could have reasonably avoided plaintiff, and if so, (3) then
hold defendant negligent in failing to avail himself of the last clear chance. Of.
Musco v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966)
Wells v. Meshall, 115 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959).
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In this area operators are aided by certain legal "presumptions"
which have emanated from the body of traffic regulations. One
may generally assume that others will obey traffic laws and sig-
nals,10 7 and that one in a place of safety will not suddenly cast
himself into an apparent danger.1 0 8 There may even be circum-
stances permitting one to assume that another will remove him
from peril. 10 9 But these presumptions fall when one has actual
or constructive notice that the other may place himself in or
fail to remove himself from danger." 1 0
Related Miscellaneous Problems
A overtakes B proceeding in the same direction at a slower
rate of speed and attempts to pass B at the same moment B
begins to make a left turn; an accident results. Assume both
parties were negligent. Most cases deny A recovery under last
clear chance.1 1' Oddly enough, it is usually plaintiff, the pass-
ing motorist, who has struck defendant; but it might be ques-
107. See, e.g., Sule v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 So. 2d 280 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1965) ; Welch v. Welch, 169 So. 2d 713 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; Lavigne v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 125 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960) ;
Whitner v. Scott, 116 So. 2d 180 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) ; Lawrence v. Sansone,
48 So. 2d 281 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950) Daly v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.,
15 So. 2d 396 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1943) Kelly v. Neff, 14 So. 2d 657 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1943).
108. See, e.g., Shipley v. Schittone, 148 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963)
Newton v. Pocillo, 111 So. 2d 895 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959) ; Ballard v. Piehler,
98 So. 2d 273 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) ; Hebert v. Meibaum, 19 So. 2d 629 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1944) (on rehearing), aff'd, 209 La. 156, 24 So. 2d 297 (1945)
Coleman v. Terrebonne Ice Co., 8 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942).
109. See Dean v. Allied Underwriters, 11 So. 2d 93 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942)
Young v. Thompson, 189 So. 487 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939) ; Patterson v. Yazoo
& M.V. R.R., 187 So. 305 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939).
110. Notice is that knowledge a reasonable man would have acquired of (1)
the incapacity of another (Gray v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 121 So. 2d 381 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1960)), (2) the helplessness of another (see Dupuy v. Veazey,
63 So. 2d 756 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953) ; Coleman v. Terrebonne Ice Co., 8 So. 2d
313 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942)), (3) the likelihood that another presently in place
of safety, will initiate a dangerous course of action (Sorrell v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
179 So. 2d 499 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) ; Bailey v. Reggie, 22 So. 2d 698 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1945)), or (4) the likelihood that another will continue a course
of action that will soon place him in peril (Granata v. Simpson, 181 So. 2d 791
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1965) ; Levy v. New Orleans & N.E.R.R., 20 So. 2d 559 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1945); Barnes v. Texas N.O.R.R., 16 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1943). The moment defendant had notice of plaintiff's probable dangerous
conduct rmarks the time when defendant should have appreciated the imminent
peril and should have tried to avert the injury.
111. See Hollabaugh-Seal Funeral Home v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 215 La.
545, 41 So. 2d 212 (1949) ; Burns v. Evans Cooperage Co., 208 La. 406, 23 So. 2d
165 (1945) ; Peninger v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 187 So. 2d 128 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1966) ; Sonnier v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 134 So. 2d 363 (1a. App. 3d Cir.
1961) (plaintiff was driver of car turning left) ; McCallum v. Adkerson, 126
So. 2d 835 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; contra, Cassar v. Mansfield Lbr. Co., 215
La. 533, 41 So. 2d 209 (1949) ; Parker v. Home Indem. Co. of N.Y., 41 So. 2d 783
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
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tioned which driver is the one in peril. When their acts are
simultaneous, it would seem that both are equally in peril and
neither occupies a better position to avoid the imminent colli-
sion. In such instances last clear chance should not be used,
for its application would place a premium on being plaintiff. 11 2
Only when the evidence establishes that B should have noticed A
once he had already committed himself to passing, in time for
B to refrain from any attempt to make his left turn, can it be
said that B had the last clear chance. 1 3
An interesting problem is presented when a train operator
observes an object ahead but cannot identify it as a helpless
person until it is too late. The cases have held that when the
train operator has knowledge of the likelihood of pedestrians
being at that place and sees an object which might reasonably
be someone asleep on the tracks, he will be liable under last
clear chance if he fails to take immediate measures to avoid it.11
4
But where pedestrians are not to be anticipated, the result is
opposite. 1 5
IV. LAST CLEAR CHANCE IN COURT
Pleading Last Clear Chance
Since the negligence of the parties is almost always a pri-
mary issue in last clear chance cases, plaintiff will seldom base
his case solely on that doctrine, for once he pleads it he admits
112. Last clear chance is a weapon intended for use by plaintiff to circumvent
the contributory negligence bar. Even were defendant to invoke the doctrine, it
can act for him only as a shield. Thus, there could result a race to the court-
house, or, alternatively, reconventional demands, in order to have the advantage
of the doctrine as a weapon, oftentimes in cases where neither party should
recover.
113. See Johnson v. Wilson, 239 La. 390, 118 So. 2(1 450 (1960) ; Peninger
v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 187 So. 2d 128 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966). In Johnson
v. Vilson the court said: "[T] he doctrine has no relevance to the case, as the
testimony indicates that both cars began to pull into the left lane at approximately
the same time, when they were too close together for either driver to act effec-
tively to avoid the accident." Id. at 401, 118 So. 2d at 454.
114. Jones v. Chicago, R.I. & 1. Rty., 162 La. 690, 111 So. 62 (1926); Mc-
Clanahan v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 111, La. 781, 35 So. 902 (1902) ; Williams
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 11 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942); Shipp v. St.
Louis S.W. By., 188 So. 526 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
115. Cheek v. Thompson, 28 F. Supp. 391 (V.D). La. 1039) ; Tyler v. Gulf,
C. & S.F. 11y., 143 La. 177, 78 So. 4:8 (1918) ; Rogers v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay.
Co., 143 l.a. 58, 78 So. 237 (1918) ; Courtney v. Louisiama Ry. & Nay. Co., 133
La. 360, 63 So. 48 (1913); cf. Smith v. New Orleans & N.E.R.M., 153 So. 2d
533 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963). Apparently the same rule applies to automobiles
striking objects which turn out to be persons asleep in the road. See Gregoire v.
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 158 So. 2d 379 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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his own negligence. 116 As a result, last clear chance is often
pleaded in the alternative. Even that is unnecessary. The Lou-
isiana Code of Civil Procedure requires that plaintiff plead
only the facts and the judgment sought. 17 He is not permit-
ted to make any replicatory pleadings;"" any new matter de-
fendant raises in his answer - such as the defense of contribu-
tory negligence - is "considered denied or avoided" as a matter
of law. 119 Since last clear chance is but a means by which the
plaintiff may avoid the consequences of the defense of contribu-
tory negligence, it is unnecessary that it be specially pleaded. 120
Further, an appellate court may invoke the doctrine though it
was not pleaded or argued at the trial. 21
Occasionally it is the answer of defendant, and not plain-
tiff's petition which invokes last clear chance.122 The courts
have consistently recognized this as proper, reasoning that since
the last clear chance may have been with either plaintiff or
defendant, the doctrine may apply against either party.123 What
defendant does by pleading last clear chance is assert by nega-
tive reasoning that the last clear chance was not with him be-
cause plaintiff had it. As, however, the function of last clear
chance is to avoid the effect of contributory negligence as a de-
fense, it is meaningless for defendant to allege it, 124 and con-
116. See, e.g., Scott v. Glazer, 164 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964)
Gregoire v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 158 So. 2d 379 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; Dean v.
Pitts, 133 So. 2d 917 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; Gray v. Great Am. Indem. Co.,
121 So. 2d 381 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
117. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 891 (1960).
118. Id. art. 852.
119. Ibid.
120. See MeMahon, Pleading and Judicial Forins, comment 2, at 252, found
in 10 LA. STAT. ANN.- CODE CIv. PROC. Form 391 (1963).
121. Iglesias v. Campbell, 175 So. 145 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937). See also
Lambert v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 148 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ;
Gallioto v. Chisholm, 126 So. 2d 63 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1960) ; Lee v. Kastner,
69 So. 2d 137 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954) (defendant urge(] the doctrine against
plaintiff) ; Daw v. Matthews, 34 So. 2d 666 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948).
122. See, e.g., Davis v. Lewis & Lewis, 226 La. 1064, 78 So. 2d 174 (1955)
Davidson v. Morrison, 153 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933) ; Muse v. Cambley,
16 So. 2d 276 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944); Crow v. State FariT Mnut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 10 So. 2d 105 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942) ; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Dambly,
8 So. 2d 345 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) ; Muse v. Gulf Refining Co., 8 So. 2d 330
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1942); Chitwood v. King, 155 So. 466 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1934).
123. This reasoning was introduced into the jurisprudence in Bergeron v. De-
partment of Highways, 221 La. 595, 60 So. 2d 4 (1952). See also, e.g., Kraft
v. U. Koen & Co., 188 So. 2d 203 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1.966) ; LeBlanc v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 162 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Emmaco Ins. Co. v.
Employers Mut. Co., 150 So. 2d 338 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; Dean v. Pitts, 133
So. 2d 917 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
124. See McMahon, Pleading and Judicial Forms, comments to Form 392,
found in 10 LA. STAT. ANN. -CODE CIV. PROC. (1963).
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fusion could be eliminated by judicial recognition that the doc-
trine is inappropriate when invoked by defendant.
Proximate Cause and Last Clear Chance
The permeation of proximate cause throughout the law of
negligence has had its effects on last clear chance. While most
of the cases speak of proximate cause, it is generally not dis-
cussed; rather it is employed as an additional method of con-
cluding which party's negligence was legally responsible for the
injury. Thus, if the court finds defendant had the last clear
chance it often adds that his negligence was the proximate cause
of the accident. 125 Proximate cause, however, should not be em-
ployed to determine ultimate liability between two negligent par-
ties when the negligence of both contributed to the accident.126
Third-Party Plaintiff: Joint Tortfeasor Cases
The application of last clear chance becomes somewhat more
complex when there are joint tortfeasors and an innocent third
party. The jurisprudence is uniform that last clear chance can-
not be invoked to the prejudice of an innocent third person.127
Thus, both tortfeasors are liable in solido to the non-negligent
third party. The reasoning and result of these cases appears
quite sound. Last clear chance is only employed between two
negligent parties to avoid the defense of contributory negligence;
it certainly should not be used to the prejudice of a non-negli-
gent party. This, however, does not prevent the court from
applying the doctrine to determine the rights of the two de-
fendants between themselves. 12
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The situation which last clear chance best fits is one where
plaintiff is helpless or where defendant's negligent conduct cre-
125. See, e.g., Rottman v. Beverly, 183 La. 947, 165 So. 153 (1935) ; Browne
v. Texas & Pac. R.R., 193 So. 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939). There appears to
be much less mention of proximate cause in more recent decisions.
126. This is the function of last clear chance. Also, unsound reasoning cal
result from overemphasis of proximate cause. See Harrow v. Owners' Auto. Ins.
Co., 160 So. 169 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935). See also Boullion v. Bonin, 2 So. 2d
535 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940) (on rehearing) ; Taylor v. Shreveport Yellow Cabs,
163 So. 737 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
127. Shield v. F. Johnson & Son, 132 La. 773, 61 So. 787 (1913); Hebert
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 179 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Abrego v. Tri-
State Transit Co., 22 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945); Killian v. Modern
Iron Works, 15 So. 2d 532 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943) ; Tarlton-Gaspard v. Malochee,
16 La. App. 527, 133 So. 409 (1931).




ates a disproportionally greater risk of serious injury than does
plaintiff's negligent conduct; that is, where mutuality of risk
is lacking. 129 But where two instrumentalities are involved and
there is no appreciable difference in the risks created by their
operation, it is submitted that last clear chance should only be
applied when plaintiff is helpless or when plaintiff's inattention
is discovered by defendant (that is, where defendant can be said
to be sulbstantially more at fault in causing the accident). If
mutuality of risks is present, it is improper to ground liability
upon the principle that defendant's duty extends to protecting
a plaintiff from his own negligence, or that defendant should
have anticipated plaintiff's negligence; for plaintiff's duty is
of the same scope, and he should be equally on the lookout for
defendant's negligence.
In the administration of justice between two negligent par-
ties it is impossible for a judge and jury not to consider the
degree of fault of each in reaching a decision. Last clear chance
is a formulation of some important factors in determining de-
grees of fault. Since that is what the courts are doing, it seems
prefertable that they should recognize the process for what it is.
If this were done, comparative negligence would be adopted and
last clear chance would become purposeless. Comparative negli-
gence presents many advantages over the present method of
solving cases. It is uncomplicated and easy to administer; it is
more realistic and more just. While other states could not adopt
comparative negligence without special legislation, Louisiana is
free of that obstacle, for the principle of comparative negligence
is expressly provided in article 2323 of the Civil Code. 130 All
that is lacking is judicial recognition and application of existing
legislation.1" Until such time one must endure the contributory
negligence rule and the problems it provokes. Likewise, last
clear chance, nourished by these problems, will remain.
Scotty G. Rozas
129. This explains why courts impose a high standard of care on operators
of moving vehicles and a lower standard on pedestrians. This may be taken one
step further by separating train operators from other types of operators and
demand of railroad companies an even higher standard of care than is demanded
from automobile drivers. In all cases the standard of care is commensurate with
the hazards a particular type of conduct imposes upon public safety. It might be
helpful for courts to recognize the distinction between last clear chance cases
involving (1) a motor vehicle and a pedestrian, (2) two motor vehicles, and
perhaps (3) a train and a pedestrian or motor vehicle.
130. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2323 (1870).
131. See Malone, Comparative Negligence, Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6
LA. L. REV. 125 (1945).
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